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Abstract: Diagnosing gaming disorder requires that mental health 
practitioners weigh in patient's values in an appropriate symmetry with 
an evidence-based approach to deal with patient's issues. Nevertheless, to 
date, the science of gaming disorder tends to overemphasize psychophar-
macological and therapeutic intervention, while the importance of values is 
ignored to the periphery. We argue in this paper, for gaming disorder 
formalization to be rigid, the science of gaming disorder needs further 
research and its scientific basis be established with an improved data of 
the players at the local level. 
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Analytical method approach is taken in this paper to address the 
formalization of gaming disorder; the systematic analysis is due to the theo-
retical scope of this paper. In this analysis, we draw our data juxtaposing the 
data of proponents of formalization of gaming disorder with those that 
called for caution. Inferences derived from the findings are used to suggest a 
path forward. 
Introduction 
After the demise of closed mental health research, the future of re-
search tends to oscillate in the direction of evidence-based and open re-
search. We shall not here attempt to criticize that position, but rather at-
tempt to outline a comprehensive account. If the future of research is in the 
direction of open research, it is within this context; we address the contro-
versies surrounding gaming disorder as a disease. 
Vladmir Poznyyak, member of WHO's office of mental health and 
substance abuse, convincingly argues for the need to add gaming disorder to 
the list of ICD list of disorders. As a representative of WHO, he explains 
that this disorder can reach the threshold to warrant a psychopharmacologi-
cal intervention (Susan Scutti, CNN, 2018). What exactly is gaming disorder? 
According to WHO, gaming disorder is presented to have the features of 
impaired control over gaming. For the patients suffering from this disorder 
as WHO's office put it, the gaming activity supersedes other social activities 
of the individual. Supporters of this inclusion have welcomed the attempt to 
formalize gaming disorder as a disease. In the ICD list, for example, Mueller 
and Woelfling (2017) begin their support for the inclusion of gaming disor-
der by emphasizing that normality can quickly become abnormality. They 
claim that certain behaviors that are meant to make our life enjoyable can 
easily make life unbearable. The duo explicate that supporting the inclusion 
of gaming disorder in the ICD list as a disease is of great benefit to the prac-
titioner and the patient, as they put it: "One prerequisite for being in the 
position of receiving therapeutic help is having a clear diagnosis a therapist 
can rely on – and here we are finally, leaving the scientific ivory tower be-
hind and understanding that clinical reality demands having an ICD diagno-
sis of IGD. Thus, to conclude, instead of being afraid of "moral panic," we 
have to be aware of the opportunities for treatment an ICD diagnosis can 
offer‖ (p.120). 
The authors recognize that there are moral concerns in pushing gam-
ing disorder as a disorder (Müller & Wölfling, 2017). We believe that push-
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ing gaming disorder in the realm of abnormality without rigorous scientific 
basis can lead to stigmatization of subjects playing games. Others have made 
similar claims that moving in the direction of formalizing gaming disorder 
without substantial empirical evidence is problematic to the society at large 
(Van Rooij et al., 2018). The matter on the table for discussion is where the 
line of demarcation lies, when what is designed to be enjoyable becomes 
unbearable. For instance, contemporary theories of education suggest em-
ploying games in classes to enhance the cognitive capability of learners. 
Kardefelt-Winther et.al (2017) attempt to disentangle this entanglement per-
taining the line of demarcation by proposing that the best way to conceptu-
alize behavioral addiction is to codify it in a functional sense, that is, as a 
functional impairment in clinical settings under the guidance of health pro-
fessionals, rather than applying surveys in a healthy population. Besides, they 
include persistence over time  to be part of the indicator to consider when ad-
dressing gaming disorder (Kardefelt-Winther et al., 2017). Do these factors 
mentioned by Kardefelt-Winther et al. resolved the classification of gaming 
disorder as a disease? Two things that quickly come to mind is- firstly, how 
do we balance diagnosis with freedom to play games? Secondly, who get to 
determine the criteria for the disease? One can easily say from the questions 
above that a comprehensive diagnosis will involve the participatory patients 
within a clinical setting, that is, a subjective account from patient's perspec-
tive given that a brain account is not available yet to determine gaming dis-
order from practitioner's perspective. A highly participatory method is likely 
to turn out to be beneficial to patients during treatment. Now, the challenge 
we currently face is the objectification of gaming disorder as a disease is 
predicated most times from practitioners' perspective. We do not claim that 
patient's expression should be taken literally, this should be integrated within 
a balanced norm of the existing environmental cues and for those practi-
tioners in diverse settings, understanding the cultural dimension of patient's 
environment is key to a successful treatment. 
Conceptual Challenges facing the formalization of gaming disorder as 
a disorder 
At matter here is not just the trade-off between an objective func-
tionalist account that Mueller and Woelfling propagate to be central to the 
diagnosis of gaming disorder and qualitative investigation of the problem of 
gaming disorder, but also the extent to which the science of gaming disorder 
allows practitioners to capture the indicators of these disorders during the 
practitioner-patient relationship (Müller & Wölfling, 2017). It is writ large 
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that the practitioner would struggle empirically, identifying the subjects who 
claimed that they do not have the disorder, despite a family member might 
have felt the need for psychopharmacological or therapeutic intervention. 
An example where this tension can arise is the case where a British player of 
the game Pokemon (played on mobile devices, outdoor game), claimed that 
the digital game has helped in his attempt to lose weight. According to this 
player, he walked 141 miles in 20 days prompting his weight to drop. As he 
explains,  he could fit into trousers he had not worn in six years. It is plausi-
ble in the case mentioned above that a family member might be concerned 
about this player playing Pokemon that this activity has superseded all his 
social activities (Sophie Eastaugh, for CNN, 2016). Should this then be con-
sidered as a disorder? Does gaming disorder as being described have the data 
that cover the way to measure the persistence of the activity, before it exac-
erbates to a disorder? Do we have enough data to verify the "I experiential" 
account during the practitioner-patient interaction? In this paper, we refer to 
―I experiential‖ as the self that interacts with her Umwelt to form the founda-
tion of his/her understanding through sensorimotoric and embodied en-
gagements. These questions suggest that it would be cardinal that formaliza-
tion of gaming disorder would require it to be expanded, so therefore opera-
tionalizing gaming disorder would require additional findings and these addi-
tional findings will require the integration of subjective accounts of gaming 
participants. 
Even, in the case of severe mental disorders, delusion as a mental 
disorder, the evidence that false belief stems from the brain is still vague and 
continuous research is likely in this area as Fuchs nicely points out, that de-
lusion usually comes to reality within intersubjective experiences. The patient 
usually struggles to align his or her thoughts with others, a situation that can 
lead to double bookkeeping, that is, instead of integrating the thought of 
others, patients tend to juxtapose his/her thoughts against others. If this is 
captured during the intersubjective experience, seeking falsifiable account in 
the brain might be elusive to the practitioner. In the severe case of schizo-
phrenia, which delusion is a feature, Thomas Fuchs, (2015) claims: "No mat-
ter what their neurobiological presuppositions and neurocognitive compo-
nents are – no doubt that these are of crucial importance – delusions are not 
just products of individual brains. Their basis is not a faulty representation 
of the world, but a failure of enacting a shared world through interaction 
with others" (p.179). 
At least, it is essential to demand that the understanding of gaming 
disorder be normatively and implicitly understood before the formalization 
of the disorder, especially, the call to improve the science of gaming disor-
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der. Fuchs, Sass and Byrom would welcome such call, as they have called for 
more studies on the subjective account of the individuals suffering from 
mental disorders (Fuchs, 2015; Sass and Byrom, 2015). We suggest that con-
temporary ampliative understanding of gaming disorder would help clear the 
conceptual clouds over the formalization of gaming disorder as a disease. 
Contemporary ampliative Understanding of Gaming Disorder 
Van Rooij et al. (2018) ardently argue for the need to have robust 
scientific standard before the formalization of gaming disorder as a mental 
disorder. We are wholly sympathetic to such call, even when we 
acknowledge that the formalization has already taken place, yet we want to 
direct the reader's focus to an additional aspect of the debate, a dimension 
that is often precluded or push to the periphery during the conversation, the 
contemporary ampliative understanding of gaming disorder, which can be 
explicated analytically and phenomenologically. This, we believe, will drive 
the conversation forward and assist our colleagues at WHO when deciding 
about how to solidify gaming disorder's empirical basis in order to enhance 
understanding. 
Examining gaming disorder, we notice a description that encom-
passes our normative approaches, which entail our values in bodily connec-
tion with our shared experiences and during specific application can be heu-
ristic. Understanding gaming disorder's connection to a holistic level, where 
the data of the "I experiential" is integrated into the treatment approach, 
simultaneously recognizing the measurable dimension of the mental pro-
cesses. The contemporary ampliative understanding seeks to explain that 
likely, the central norms of a gaming disorder are within the domain of our 
normative understanding and neuropsychological domain. The normative 
questions raised by gaming disorder is not a position that we believe that the 
quantitative dimension will not be able to answer. We contend the obstacles 
right now to fully understand the status of gaming disorder is an epistemic 
stage that additional research into the "I experiential" would be able to ac-
count for missing puzzle. We claim there can be consilience in establishing 
the formalization of gaming disorder through the application of contempo-
rary ampliative understanding, an approach, informed by the quantitative 
aspects in consonance with the data of the "I experiential" mediating the two 
in a cognitive-affective regulation. For gaming disorder as a disease to be 
anchored empirically, we suggest that the data of the "I experiential" data be 
systematically integrated into the robust science of gaming disorder. We be-
lieve at this current stage, the science of gaming disorder is not solid enough 
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to warrant its inclusion as a disease. We have seen authors in recent years 
that have raised questions about the validity of empirical foundations of 
psychological science. This should come as no surprise, given the complexity 
of the brain-mind system. As Schimmack Ulrich (2012) observes that psy-
chologists rush into judgment believing that raising the number of replica-
tions within an article enhances the validity of psychological science. This 
has proven not to be the case due to the derived understanding gained from 
the conceptual understanding of the self. 
Correspondingly, Ledgerwood & Sherman (2012 ) claim that implicit 
credence to the problem of data processing to further increase the number 
of positive replication studies to ensure scientific credibility is based on false 
assumption because the assumption that multiple replications represent a 
litmus test for strong evidence of a hypothesis can be illusory. Coupled with 
psychiatric epidemiology challenges, the meta-analysis of scientific-data is 
value-laden, and when the values are not balanced appropriately, we see a 
shift in the outcome and process of the empirical data. Besides, the success 
conspicuous in genomics is more in the field of disease-modifying drugs in 
general medicine. The clinical psychopharmacologic attempts to extrapolate 
data from animal models is still ongoing but moving slowly. The roadblock 
slowing the process down, as Nutt et al. ( 2006) put it, is the absence of suit-
able animal models result and extrapolating data has not been easy because 
translating findings in animals to efficacy in humans has proven to be com-
plicated. They see future development likely in the field of disease-modifying 
drugs in general medicine than in the area of neuropsychiatric diseases. They 
say if similar animal models could be put in place for other cognitively im-
pairing neuropsychiatric conditions, there would be progress in the field. 
Given all these challenges to collate data objectively outside of patient's ex-
perience, it would be appropriate to seek answers from different approaches, 
hence our call to seek ―I experiential data‖. 
We understand that playing games excessively can lead to inchoate 
feelings, but a contemporary ampliative understanding of gaming disorder 
would require a robust scientific backbone for its formalization to be rigid, 
failure to adhere to this standard can lead to abuse of the rights of subjects 
who play games to cope with other challenges in their life. During the for-
malization of a disorder, it is crucial to allow the interpenetration of the 
qualitative dimensions of mental states and their measurable domain. We 
notice in the case of gaming disorder; its measurable dimension is not yet on 
firm footing, as discussed in this paper. The contribution of the group 
around King et al. (2013) validate this concern we have about the methodol-
ogy researchers employ to capture the clinical perspective of gaming disor-
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der, as they point out that diverse psychometric properties of assessment 
require additional improvement. 
Others have made similar claims, based on a range of research stud-
ies that underscore how unstructured power determines the modus operandi in 
psychopharmacology (Bamijoko-Okungbaye Abiola, 2019). For example, 
Chris Chambers (2019) calls the issues we are currently facing in methodolo-
gy as the seven sins of psychology, subscribing to our assertions that open 
science, an emerging philosophy that aspires to make research more trans-
parent as possible would be the best route to correct the problems of meth-
odology. Contrary to the popular paradigm, then, neither quintessence nor 
verity are the aspirations of quantitative aspects of cognitive-affective sys-
tems. As researchers or doctors, we must recognize this and acknowledge 
that our tools can be imperfect. For this reason, contemporary ampliative 
understanding of gaming disorder would require that the science of gaming 
disorder reaches the level of rigorous theory building, theory testing, and 
replicated, these are the basis of proper scientific research. It would be topsy 
-turvy to create a diagnosis that would affect the populace based on weak 
scientific grounds, so therefore in therapeutic settings, our approach, that is, 
calling for an alternative that will include the data of the players and well 
balanced within the empirical data is an avenue to pursue. 
Arguments for the Integration of the "I experiential" cognitive-
affective system instead of Juxtaposition of data in gaming disorder. 
Mueller and Woelfling (2017) claim that the clinical perspective is 
cardinal to the formalization of gaming disorder. We think that claim is a fair 
assessment; however, when claiming that the science of gaming disorder is 
up to par with rigorous research, such assertion has a modicum of evidence. 
We call for the integration of the "I experiential" data with the clinical data, 
as of current standard, the science of gaming disorder will require additional 
multidisciplinary research before its evidence can reach a holistic level that 
will benefit patients who might seek intervention for their struggle. We sup-
port patients who consented to intervention to address their struggles with 
video games. We notice that this ongoing debate about the status of gaming 
disorder has been ongoing in the realm of the juxtaposition of facts. 
Consequently, this has led to dubious treatment centers and gov-
ernmental intervention in certain countries, such as South Korea . We con-
tend such direction can lead to abuse and overdiagnosis in mental health, 
synthesizing the data of the "I experiential" in confluence with clinical di-
mension would represent a comprehensive body-brain-mind system in a 
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contextual calculus. Formalization of disorders is not a novel approach in 
medicine; it is fundamental to mental health approaches. In most cases, this 
is done analytically, not by intuition, but we intuit that formalization of dis-
orders displays in itself a different facet, a multifactorial formalization. 
Sometimes, researchers and mental health practitioners use mathematical 
quantities or factor in overlapping quotients during treatment plans. Nota-
bly, in gaming disorder, the data of the "I experiential" would certainly add 
value to the rigorous formalization of the disorder, we have not noticed a 
slam-dunk argument against the integration of the "I experiential" data into 
the formalization of gaming disorder. What we demand is that the science 
behind the formalization be within the standard of the scientific aspirations, 
that is, pre-established findings of the ―I experiential‖ data associated with 
the robust data of the objective analysis. For example, Van Rooij et al. 
(2018) put it lucidly: "The answer is, of course, that prior to enshrining gam-
ing disorder as a diagnosis, its clinical utility must be demonstrated in high-
quality, transparent research with patients‖ (p.5). 
Focusing solely on the mental causation dimension of gaming disor-
der might hide the structural and normative dimension of the "I experien-
tial", which should be part of the holistic consideration during treatment of 
gaming disorder given that absolute validity can be outside of our quantita-
tive research. The clinical objectivity guidance used to determine the scien-
tific explication of gaming disorder tends to be too mechanistic, resulting in 
gaming disorder, developed as a causal disorder state considering the multi-
layered links within the structural construct of the "I experiential‖. Research 
shows that people of a certain age tend to have more than one functional 
malady. We suggest that the triangulation of data will further assist in the 
formalization of gaming disorder if the threshold of it being a disorder is 
reached, and this should start with fine-tuned and fine-grained analysis of 
the "I experiential" data concomitantly with that clinical data. Bruno Schvin-
ski’s research (Pontes et al., 2019) is a move in the right direction, that is, 
determining the factors that contribute to gaming disorder as a disease. Con-
temporary disease formalization should be premised on rigorous scientific 
findings within the framework of contemporary ampliative understanding of 
mental conditions, but in gaming disorder, the evidential data is difficult to 
track down. 
What is needed to improve the current status quo is the integration of 
subjective accounts of players suffering from gaming disorder, into the per-
imetric objective accounts of patient's sensomotoric Umwelt experiences. As 
we show in this paper that people sometimes participate in gaming to cope 
with other mental conditions, we must be cautious not to pathologize each 
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reaction to a stressor as a disease. Getting stressed from activities does not 
necessarily indicate a mental disease. The challenge with gaming disorder as 
a disease is how do we go about treatment of gaming disorder psychophar-
macologically when its scientific basis is not yet fully grasped? Again, the 
stakeholders must invest in further research involving academics from vari-
ous disciplines, as part of open research, the healthcare ecosystem should be 
widened to include active gamers in decision- making. This helps the domain 
of clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. 
The other area we are concerned about is the direct link of gaming 
to violence with blurred scientific evidence. We indicated in this paper that 
certain people play games to deal with life's challenges. Moreover, mental 
health research shows that most people with mental disorders pose no threat 
to anyone but themselves. We do acknowledge that severe mental illness can 
be a risk factor, usually, in confluence with other factors, that is, a multifac-
torial link. Even then, it is essential in the case that the court wants to accept 
the neuroscientific evidence as proof to determine whether the patient in-
volved meets the criterion of mens rea, the court must possess an understand-
ing of conceptual-analytic methodology required for the evaluation of scien-
tific evidence (Bamijoko-Okungbaye, 2019). Finding balance when deter-
mining moral culpability is essential to this particular decision-making. We 
share the assertion that certain people do play game excessively due to akra-
sia, but do we have robust scientific elucidation on akrasia of gaming disor-
der? This prompted Wagenmakers et al. (2012) to propose recommenda-
tions to increase the veracity of empirical findings. As they put it: "This 
fairy-tale factor increases the probability that a presented finding is fictional 
and hence non-replicable. We propose a radical remedy — preregistration 
— to ensure scientific integrity and inoculate the research process against 
the inalienable biases of human reasoning‖ (p.633). 
In spite of the fact that addiction might be appropriate to address 
the issue of overplaying games , this might be deemed too generic and runs 
the risk of being weaponized to reach inimical goals. Due to these challenges 
surrounding gaming disorder as a disease, we posit that WHO supports local 
programmes that support mental health understanding and fund those pre-
vention programmes at the local level. 
What is next for Gaming disorder as a disease? 
Clinical perspective has produced substantial development which has 
allowed formalization of mental disorders, regrettably the mechanistic nature 
of this methodology has pushed for objective evidence in psychopharmacol-
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ogy and mental health which is claimed to be neutral, pushing the "I experi-
ential" data to the periphery. Because of this, we have seen an increased 
abuse in medicine based on iterated errors that could have been avoided by 
additional training. The current classification of gaming disorder is repre-
sentative of a larger problem, that is, rushing to formalization without ade-
quate empirical and "I experiential" data. Walking our readers throughout 
this paper, we have echoed the importance of having a robust data of the 
quantitative and the "I experiential" data, which should be integrated into a 
robust technical methodology, this approach we believe is the way forward. 
The systematic culmination of this data above is within the framework of 
contemporary ampliative understanding of gaming disorder. 
Higuchi et al. (2017) state that the formalization will open doors for 
additional research given the insufficiency of the current empirical data. It is 
plausible that we see extensive research due to the formalization of a disor-
der. Is it not reversed empirically to formalize a disorder without robust da-
ta? Petry and O' Brien (2013) predict these improvements in DSM-5, when 
gaming disorder is categorized to be a disorder that requires further study, as 
shown in this paper, the comprehensive data of the "I experiential" and clin-
ical data are yet to be achieved. Critics of our work have said the quick for-
malization will reduce moral panic, as history teaches us to take a cursory 
glance at the scientific data of mental disorders with a pinch of salt. Formali-
zation based on weak scientific grounds and "I experiential‖ data exacerbates 
moral panic. 
Conclusions 
Our contribution in this paper is not to prevent gaming disorder 
formalization as a disease; instead, to distinctly argue that formalization 
should be predicated on rigorous empirical data integratively with the data of 
the "I experiential" to form the clinical foundation. On gaming disorder, we 
have seen a rush to formalization without sufficient data. It is this normative 
structure of the "I experiential" and less rigorous science of gaming disorder 
that does not fit easily to the listing in ICD. Hence, the contemporary ampli-
ative account presented in this paper. We must allow the possibility of get-
ting out of a loop that projects to push the data of the "I experiential" to the 
periphery. Why do we think formalizing a disorder that is based on weak 
scientific ground and data of the "I experiential" is the way out of the pre-
dicament that formalization of gaming disorder finds itself? 
We acknowledge that the objective data that is captured during re-
search is vital to the codification of gaming disorder, however, the evidence 
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of the data of the "I experiential‖ is equally as important in the formaliza-
tion, so therefore we suggest to our colleagues in WHO, World Health Or-
ganization, to support the opening of research ecosystem that opens itself to 
gamers, gaming industry executives, doctors, therapists and others, especially 
the data of the research should reflect all gamers regardless of age. We wel-
come the seminal qualitative work of Snodgrass et al. (2018) paper, this is a 
great move in the right direction. ICD listing is an international listing, and it 
is our opinion that the social and contextual dimension should be factored in 
during research and decision-making process, as the saying goes, cosmopoli-
tan thought is an aggregate of local events. We do not deny the mechanistic 
approach as part of the foundation to improve the formalization of gaming 
disorder. However, what we deny is that we should prevent from the outset 
the data of the "I experiential" during formalization. We remain optimistic 
that WHO will support initiatives that will support a rigid classification of 
gaming disorder as a disease integrating the data of the players symmetrically 
with robust scientific data of gaming disorder. 
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